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Mustafa Yaylali, Istanbul / Turkey 
 
Community and Law: Identifying the Locus of Law in Community 
 
Abstract:  “Community  and  law  approach”  provides  an  illuminating  insight  into  alternative  legal 
orderings within a social unit. The comprehensiveness of legal systems within a community or a social 
unit,  provides  a  suitable  basis  for  a  structural  framework  of  alternative  legal  systems  or  Legal 
Pluralism, which is missing in the discourse on Legal Pluralism. “Identifying the locus of law within a 
community”, provides us with an indication on how autopoietic a legal system can be within a social 
unit, taking into account the social rootedness of legal norms.  
 
I. Introduction 
“A legal concept of community is devised to highlight the need for regulatory expression of 
communal  relationships  of  trust;  it  recognizes  the  variety  of  these  relationships  and  the 
diversity of forms of their expression. Consequently, it facilitates a pluralistic view of law. It 
recognizes the importance of order and coordination and the present, though not necessarily 
permanent,  dominance  of  state  law  in  defining  and  shaping  the  regulatory  conditions  of 
community.“
1 
  
The  ambiguity  of  the  concept  of  legal  pluralism  is  mainly  the  result  to  lack  of  a 
comprehensive organizational and/or institutional framework, which may clarify how these 
legal norms are generated and maintained.  Although many definitions and perspectives of 
Legal Pluralism has passed the revue in the last decades, none of them actually has tackled the 
issue of the need for a comprehensive and a sound concept of legal pluralism. The main 
criticism to the concept of Legal Pluralism was its ill-founded analytical foundation.  
In this paper I would like to argue that the concept of community, as a social unit, will 
provide  us  to  overcome  this  lacuna  in  defining  law  as  a  plural  concept.  The 
comprehensiveness of this social unit will exemplify how certain autonomous legal systems 
can reside without keeping hold on a state system. Moreover, I want to assert that law is being 
nourished and supported within its social environment, though at the same time comprises a 
distinct phenomenon than merely a social conduct. In other words, law is part of the social 
organism but cannot be equated with just social conduct or behaviour.  
                                                           
1 Roger Cotterrell, A Legal Concept of Community,12 Can. J.L. & Soc. 75, 1997   2 
This is why the purpose of this paper is to try to locate the phenomenon of law with a 
social unit like community. I want to analyse how community or association generate legal 
norms (rules) and how they manage to maintain the legal order by their peculiar way of 
enforcement. More in particular, I want to locate the locus of law, within this overarching 
social unit, community.  
As Cotterrell has put  it:  “To link law and community is  thus  to  explore continually 
shifting patterns of social variation expressed or reflected in legal diversity. It is to hold out 
the possibility of theorizing law as a social phenomenon that is something other, or something 
more, than the law of the nation state as a political society.”
2  
Consequently, I will embark on my inquiry with defining the concept of community in a 
way with which I can work with I this paper. The concept of community has been scrutinized 
from many fields, like sociological, anthropological, political and economical. Even recently,  
legal scholars started to show some interest in the concept of community as an organizational 
form, which can accommodate legal norms. This is a result from the effects which has arisen 
from  globalisation  and  subsequent  mobility  of  human  beings,  making  it  easier  for 
communities to travel around and settling down. After this attempt of defining the concept of 
community, I will continue elaborating the typification, which Ferdinand Tönnies has used for 
his sociological research.  
This  typification  of  Tönnies  between  Gemeinschaft  and  Gesellschaft  (society), 
illuminates  the  postion  and  the  difference  which  Gemeinschaftt  and  Gesellschaft  expose 
towards each other. It is within this dichotomy between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, in 
which I can explain clearly the internal differences between laws as we adopt in the modern 
society and law with a community. 
Departing from the Tönnies distinction, one of my arguments to identify the locus of law 
in community, is to explain the difference of legal framework that underlies a Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft. Namely, I will claim that the difference between these two frameworks is 
based on Trust on the one hand and Logical relationship, on the other.  
Trust relationship is one the essential characteristic of a community, since it forms the 
basis for many actions, simply because of the fact that men trust each other, either because of 
the kind of relationship they maintain or the fact that they share the same value. I will explain 
this further. I will also try to explain for example why trust in economics is conceived as an 
important ‘social capital’.  
                                                           
2 See Roger Cotterrell, p.78   3 
Furthermore, I will emphasise on the importance of value in maintaining and enforcing 
the trust relationship. Moreover, I will explain the difference between Values as opposed to 
merely (system) of rules. People from the same community, either religious or ideological, or 
from any other grounds, base they actions mainly on the same values. Those values are so 
important because they constitute one the elements to be part from the community. Values are 
guiding lines, which induce an individual to act in a certain way. 
Eventually, I will try to explain in this paper how the enforcement of this so-called, trust 
relationship and values are being endorsed and entrusted to a certain institution. Alternative 
Dispute  Resolution  explains,  which  methods  can  be  adopted  to  enforce  rules  within  a 
community. Since trust-based relationship constitutes the cornerstone of this relationship, the 
subsequent aim of ADR is the restoration of this trust-based relationship. In contrary to the 
kind  of  court-based  (judicatory)-system  we  are  familiar  with,  ADR  is  not  based  on 
mathematical construction of legal rules or legal reasoning, which will enforce justice. Instead 
they will employ all methods that will enable the restoration of trust between members, which 
underlies their relationship.  
 Since it is impossible to point out the source or resources of law within a community, by 
juxtaposing all the above-mentioned three component to societies equivalent, namely logic, 
rules and judicatory system, I am able to identify the locus of law within community. 
 
II. Concept of Community 
A community is, as I would delineate it, a social unit, which keeps its outer boundaries closed 
for outsiders to enter and insiders to leave.  It  is a social unit, which is a closed, unified 
system, and because of this it will provide advantages for their members. Community is by far 
not a romantic concept (as Teubner, David Nelken, Steven Brint argue)
3, but a concept, which 
is as ancient as humanity and is founded the virtue to survive.  
 A  community  is  established  for  people,  sharing  common  features,  which  might  be 
language, culture, religion, and profession and so on. In this sense, the community is therefore 
a closed system. It is made only for people identical on certain aspects, and does not have an 
open  door  policy  or  an  exit  strategy.  In  this  sense  it  resembles,  as  Cotterrell  made  the 
comparison, with Carl Schmitt’s
4 Friend and Foe dichotomy. The difference between other 
communities is a matter that reinforces the identity of the community. 
                                                           
3 David Nelken, Eugen Ehrlich, Living Law, and Plural 
Legalities, Legal Pluralism, Privatisation of Law and Multiculturalism,  Volume 9, Number 2 July 2008 Article 
6; Günther Teubner, Two Face of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism; Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revistied: A 
Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept,   
4 Carl Schmitt,  Der Begriff des Politischen (München 1927)   4 
A more elaborate, but a quite simple definition of what community should denote, is 
provided by Tönnies, on whose conception of community I will base my exploration on the 
locus of law within community. Tönnies argues namely that “The group which is formed 
through  this  positive  type  of  relationship  is  called  an  association  (Verbindung)  when 
conceived of as a thing of being which acts as a unit inwardly and outwardly. The relationship 
itself, and also the resulting association, is conceived of either as real and organic life- this is 
the essential characteristic of the Gemeinschaft (community)- or as imaginary and mechanical 
structure- this is the concept of Gesellschaft (society)”.
5 
 
Althussius on the other hand gives us a more political, and strangely enough a more 
sophisticated outline of what community signifies. According to him, “The community is an 
association formed by fixed laws and composed of many families and collegia living in the 
same place. It is elsewhere called a city in the broadest sense, or a body of many and diverse 
associations.--- Furthermore, this community is either rural or urban. A rural community is 
composed of those who cultivate the fields and exercise rural functions.”
6 
Steven Brint tries to give us a more elaborated, sociological account of what community 
actually entails and gives a detailed outline on which parts community is composed of. He 
defines community as “…aggregates of people who share common activities and/or beliefs 
and who are bound together principally by relations of affect, loyalty, common values, and/or 
personal concern  (i.e. interest in the personalities and life events of one another. Motives of 
interaction are thus centrally important in this definition, as they were for Tönnies. However, 
at least one outcome of these motives is also important. Because of the relative informality 
and consummatory character of communal relations, communities are based on a sense of 
familiarity with others whose full personality is relatively well known and not predominantly 
shaped  by  formal  role  relations.  Thus,  while  a  sense  of  community  can  be  sustained  in 
aggregates  of  as  many  as  tens  of  thousands,  true  communities  of  place  are  invariably 
relatively small. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that not all communal social relations are 
amicable;  a  sense  of  security  in  the  face  of  disliked  others  is  deeply  characteristic  of 
communal relations.”
7 
Robert Sampson on the other hand tried to distinguish the concept of community further 
and gave a further clarification in how communities are erupted. He argues, “The systemic 
model of community social organization conceptualises the local community as a complex 
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6  Johannes Althusius, Politica (1614), p. 40 
7  Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept,  p.9   5 
system of friendship and kinship networks and formal and informal associational ties rooted 
in  family  life  and  ongoing  socialization  process  (Kasarda  &Janowitz  1974).  The  term 
systemic  highlights  the  theoretical  focus  on  the  system  of  social  ties  embedded  within 
ecological, institutional, and normative community structures. The basic hypothesis derived 
firm  this  conceptualisation  is  that  length  of  residence  is  the  key  exogenous  factor  that 
influences attitude and behaviour toward the community. “
8 
Above, I have tried to give some definitions of the concept of community in order to 
have a kind of view in which way we have to look when we start to explore to the locus of 
law in community. A clear concept of “community and Law” approach is not given. It leans 
very much on sociological account of community and is therefore very much dependant on 
sociological description of community. 
Still Cotterrell has made an attempt to provide at least a kind of guidelines of where to 
look at if we try to apply the concept of community in legal perspective.  
Cotterrell has tried to make a distinction in different forms of communities following 
Max Weber’s concept of community. He argues that: ”Following this schema, community can 
be associated, first, with habitual or traditional forms of interaction: with the often accidental 
circumstance  that  people  find  themselves  coexisting  in  a  shared  environment.  This  is 
traditional community. It includes what sociologists often refer to as  “local community”- the 
coexistence of people in a defined geographical space; a neighbourhood, for example. But an 
empirical  correlate  of  traditional  community  is  also  found  in  the  sharing  of  language.  A 
linguistic community, in ordinary terminology, is a group of people who have a particular 
language or dialect in common. Often, of course, local and linguistic groups reinforce each 
other’s  identity.  Secondly,  community  may  be  associated  with  a  convergence  of  interest 
among  a  group.  This  is  instrumental  community,  or  community  of  interest.  Is  closest 
empirical  correlate  is  a  typical  business  community,  or  perhaps  the  original  European 
Economic Community. Thirdly, community may refer to the sharing of beliefs or values that 
stress solidarity and interdependence.  This can be termed community of beliefs. Religious 
congregations,  churches  or  sects  of  various  kinds  most  obviously  approximate  this  type. 
Finally, the uniting of individuals by their mutual affection may be thought of in terms of 
community. This type can be called affective community. The legal philosopher John Finnis 
has noted that this is the kind of community in which “groupness” in itself is most important; 
indeed, “the most intense form of community [is] the friendship of true friends.” These four 
ideal types correlate indirectly with Max Weber’s four ideal types of social action. Their 
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  70 
Soc. F. 43 1991-1992 .   6 
formulation is an effort to extent Weber’s typification of action into a typification of basic 
forms of collective involvement and interaction. Thus, traditional community correlates with 
Weber’s  type  of  traditional  action,  instrumental  community  with  purpose-rational  action, 
community  of  belief  with  value-rational  action,  and  affective  community  with  affective 
action.”
9 
Thus, the concept of community, as I am utilizing it in this paper has nothing in common 
with the communitarian political ideology. This approach is not a political concept but a more 
sociological/anthropological one, which tries to determine the inner social organization that 
exists within the society. Society, as such is a concept, which is emanated from a political 
theoretical approach that departs from the ruler-ruled dichotomy. However, society is not just 
a blank accumulation of individuals, which are kept together by the state, in the contrary. 
Society is further demarcated by different groups, organizations communities and association 
that has a greater influence on shaping and influencing the individual than the state alone.  
Society or ‘Gesellschaft’ as Tönnies phrased it, is a creation of state, which is comprised 
of a collection of different individuals altogether. Society is shaped in such way that it suits 
the governing structure of the state. This also explains why any other intermediary governing 
structures  like  communities  are  not  allowed  within  the  state,  at  least  officially.   
However, due to global changes around the world, which increased the mobility of different 
communities from third world countries to the west, this firm institution of a society got 
challenged somehow.  Because of this demographic changes around the world, community as 
a  concept  gained  importance  in  sociological  research,  into  the  nature  of  its  institutional 
framework.  Community,  as  a  vital  factor  in  society,  has  been  ignored  not  only  from  a 
sociological point of view, (or at least not enough attention has been attached to this concept) 
but especially from legal point of view. Blood and honour revenge is for example one of the 
customs, which is the result of communal bondage, which an immigrant has with its kin, or 
community, which can be traced all the way back to their village.  
The importance of “Community and Law” approach is twofold. First of all it tries to 
exemplify the social and legal framework of that particular society. By having a clear picture 
of how this framework works, it enables the state, at least, to develop a policy that is adequate 
and effective enough to deal with problems that arises because of it. Especially in United 
Kingdom, Germany, France, The Netherlands and Scandinavian countries, there is a need to 
understand how this community structures work, in order to deal with the consequences that 
arises because of the clash between the community structure and society.  In this kind of 
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situation,  criminal  or  immigration  law  does  not  provide  adequate  solution  to  solve  the 
conflict. They will only deal with the symptoms of the problems.  
 Secondly,  “Community  and  Law”  approach  will  enable  us  to  understand  ‘law’  as  a 
socially embedded phenomenon, however without discarding the phenomenon of law as such. 
Law cannot be merely perceived as a social process, like social scientists has done. Being 
socially embedded means that it derives its legitimacy from the social environment, but it 
does in no way mean that it is a sociological phenomenon. This is why my aim in this paper is 
to identify and locate “law” within the community structure instead of explaining the whole 
social process.  
 
III. Tönnies Typology between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft
10 
1. The Theory of Tönnies and the distinction between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft 
Tönnies typification of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft enables me to contrast the structural 
settings between community and society, in order to clarify the distinction between modern 
law and law within community. However, there are some minor remarks, which I want to 
expose first, before embarking on the issue. 
One  of  the  criticism  against  Tönnies’  analyses,  which  I  want  to  refute,  is  that  his 
typification is simple, romantic and not appropriate for sociological, scientific research. As 
Brint asserted  “Tönnies’ highly connotative approach invited confusion about the defining 
coordinates of community, and it encouraged the tendency of subsequent writers either to 
romanticize  or  debunk  community,  rather  than  to  approach  the  issue  of  community  and 
community  types  in  a  rigorous  analytical  spirit.”
11  Because  these  typifications  are  not 
scientifically elaborated and outlined it just reflects certain sentiments of some who yearn for 
“the good old days”.  
 The problem with sociology and with certain institutions which has to be unravelled 
within  sociology,  is  that  one  has  to  start  with  simple  typification  in  order  to  embark 
scientifically on a particular issue. Making first steps in sociological inquiry requires simple 
typifications  in  order  to  demarcate  the  research  object  carefully.  From  there  on  one  can 
continue exploring or clarifying it further, or outlining research area within a certain topic. 
Moreover,  only  after  certain  simple  typifications  one  can  continue  doing  some  empirical 
scientific work, based on this typification.   
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Because “Community and Law” approach is still in its infancy, Tönnies’ typification will 
therefore also be used in my paper in order to clarify certain elements, which exists within 
community  structure  as  opposed  to  “society”  structure”.  This  typification  is  not  used  as 
scientifically proven facts, but tools to embark on a certain research area. Since I want to 
exemplify  how  community  as  a  structure  generates  legal-normative  rules,  it  is  therefore 
essential to me to put it against society’s structure. Only in this dichotomy we will understand 
how community can generate legal norms, because there is no other way. And from here on 
one can continue further to make his point by attaching an example to illustrate the theory that 
is developed.  
 Concerning the claim, which is generally aimed at the advocates of community approach 
(like  Eugen  Ehrlich)  that  Tönnies  adheres  to  a  kind  of  romantic  nostalgic  theory  of 
community, is based on a presumption and cannot be derived from facts. As Associationalists 
like Althussius, Gierke, Paul Hirst and Eugen Ehrlich has stressed, community as a concept is 
not ideal theory but based on reality and facts, which is all but romantic. Community is an 
organization of individuals who come together to cooperate. In its traditional, rural, peasant-
like version, community aims at survival. Every sociologist is aware of the oppressive nature 
of communities, which might be oppressive against individuals. This is mainly the reason 
why community is unravelled, in order to understand how it functions. I also have to add that 
in a political environment in which community as sub-unit is precluded, it is off course the 
task of sociologists  to  put  it back on the agenda again  stressing on certain  attention and 
stressing on its importance.  
 The alternative to Tönnies’ concept of community is that of Durkheim as proposed by 
Brint. According to Brint: ”Durkheim’s work represents the most important alternative to 
Tönnies’ typological approach. Like Tönnies, Durkheim
12 was impressed by the importance 
of community relations for equipping human beings with social support and moral sentiments. 
Durkheim’s  Conceptional  breakthrough  was  to  see  community  not  as  social  structure  or 
physical entity but as a set of variable properties of human interaction that could be found not 
only among tradition-bound peasants of small villages but also among the most sophisticated 
citizens of modern cities.”
13 
For  scientific  sociological  inquiry,  I  would  agree  with  Brint  and  adopt  Durkheim’s 
concept of community as an appropriate concept. However, Durkheim’s concept does not 
contribute to my inquiry in identifying the locus of law within community. It would be an apt 
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Emile Durkheim: Sociologist of Modernity, Blackwell Publishing  
13 See, Steven Brint, p.3   9 
theoretical  foundation  for  empirical  research,  but  would  not  help  me  in  explaining  how 
community generates legal norms.  
 
2. Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
According to Tönnies  "All intimate, private, and exclusive living together, so we discover, is 
understood as life in Gemeinschaft (community). Gesellschaft (Society) is public life-it is the 
world  itself.”  Gemeinschaft,  according  to  Tönnies  should  therefore  be  perceived  “…as  a 
living organism, Gesellschaft (society) as a mechanical aggregate and artefact. Everything 
real is organic in so far as it can be conceived only as something related to the totality of 
reality and defined in its nature and movements by this totality.”
14 
The importance and the necessity to address the sociological anatomy of communities is 
that (just like we have to address pluralistic legal systems in legal science), is the fact that the 
natural  organizational  structures,  which  already  exits  prior  to  societies  structure,  is  being 
overshadowed by the society as an organizational structure. This also explains that when legal 
scholars or sociologists who are trying to explore in the nature of community as a natural 
organization, they are being blamed of being “romantic”. 
Community as an organization is established based to serve “necessity” of people, while 
society is perceived as an artificial construction of the state to enable individuals to pursue 
their lifehood the way they please. This artificial construction is characterized by Logical 
construction  between  individuals.  Logical  relationships  constitutes  the  cornerstone  of 
Gesellschaft as depicted by Tönnies, and is artificial to the extent that the state has to maintain 
it by enforcing its power.  
According to  Tönnies, community or Gemeinschaft is  created by “…blood,  denoting 
unity of being, is developed and differentiated into Gemeinschaft of locality, which is based 
on a common habitat.  A further differentiation leads  to the Gemeinschaft of mind which 
implies only co-operation and co-ordinated action for a common goal.”
15 
Departing  from  this  definition  he  distinguishes  community  in  “…1)  kinship,  (2) 
neighborhood, and (3) friendship as  definite  and meaningful derivations  of these original 
categories.”
16  Although  not  exhaustive,  this  distinction  provides  us  the  “spheres”  of 
influences, in which communities (or associations) might arise.  
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15 Idem 
16 Idem   10 
Living in a community emphasises on the “locality” or proximity of the environment. 
Everything is kept simple and compact in contrary to life in a society, Gesellschaft. In a 
Gesellschaft everything is endless, and big. Moreover, cosmopolitanism for example, can be 
perceived as a big society rather than a big community. Since cosmopolitans do not know 
each  other  and  they  also  would  not  bother  to  know.  Paradoxically  this  is  why  they  are 
cosmopolitans. They reside everywhere, without getting affected by the environment. They 
can settle down and feel at home wherever they are.   
Communities, in contrary to societies, are created on the ”sameness” principle of their 
community members. They live in the same territory, they speak the same language, and they 
have the same habits the same customs. As Sampson argues: “The ordinary human being, 
therefore- in the long run and for the average of cases-feels best and most cheerful if he is 
surrounded by his family and relatives. He is among his own (chez soi)”
17 
Because community structure is comprehensive  “Neighbourhood describes the general 
character of living together in the rural village. The proximity of dwellings, the communal 
fields, and even the mere contiguity of holdings necessitate many contacts of human beings 
and cause inurnment to and intimate knowledge of one another.” 
18 
In general, compared to Gesellschaft, living outside a Gemeinschaft  is hardly to imagine. 
Community’s can be seen as a kind of safe havens, where process of movements are relatively 
free  but  outside  the  safe  circles  of  community,  suddenly  the  environment  becomes  more 
dangerous and incomprehensible. While society orderings enable individuals to move in large 
amount  of  space,  but  with  the  side  effect  of  being  distracted  from  its  surroundings, 
community on the other hand gives a certain freedom of action but within a confined spatial 
and social territory. Outside this territory, it is hard of communal member to interact. This 
explains also why communities are largely closed to outside world. 
 
IV. Trust, Values and Alternative Dispute Regulation 
1. Trust versus Logic 
a) Trust 
Trust versus Logic resembles Tönnies’ typification of Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft and 
Organic (natural) versus Artificial typification of social structures. Natural, is that what occurs 
out of nature, because of necessity or the requirements of the nature as such. Since human 
beings are “social beings”, in nature they are forced to cooperate with each other and one 
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reaches automatically to trust relationship, which exists between family members, between 
father  and  son,  Husband  and  wife,  neighbours  and  so  on.  These  relationships  are  not 
voluntarily entered but entered because the nature urges people to collaborate and cooperate 
together. This leads consequentially to a situation in which people has to trust each other and 
create s system where they will trust.  
Trust, in a community, is the natural glue that keeps the members naturally bonded and 
connected.  This  natural  connection  of  trust  is  rediscovered  by  economical  science  as  an 
advantageous element, which can lower the cost that goes along with business contracts. As 
Avner Greif argued “Reputation-based exchange is characterized by a low cost but a high 
marginal cost of exchanging with unfamiliar individuals. Law-based exchange, however, is 
characterized by the high fixed cost required to set up an effective legal system but the low 
marginal cost of establishing new exchange relationship.”
19  This is why, as Kahan argued, 
“In this self-sustaining atmosphere of trust, reliance on costly incentive schemes becomes less 
necessary.”
20 
This advantage by way of trust in economical science is called, social-capital. The trust 
relationship, which exists between parties, lowers the cost that usually goes along with the 
regular contract. If men trust each other, they will not make an appeal to the costly legal 
apparatus that is set in force in order to accommodate impersonal exchange. But what does 
social capital (in economical context) entail? 
Social capital according to Portes is described in the following way “Whereas economic 
capital is in people’s bank accounts and human capital is inside their heads, social capital 
inheres in the structure of their relationships”.
21 Contacts and networks are advantages that 
derive from social components, which benefits business contacts. As such trust is perceived as 
a social surplus that can be measured in economical terms.  
In  this  respect,  it  is  argued  that  what  contributes  to  trust-relationship  is  the  fact  of 
reciprocity between the parties. As Kahan has clearly mentioned, “…logic of collective action 
counsels the creation of appropriate external incentives, the logic of reciprocity suggests the 
importance of promoting trust”
22 
Collective action, as mentioned by Kahan is triggered by collective goals and aims, these 
collective  goals  are  in  turn,  supported  and  accommodated  by  values,  which  are  shared 
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commonly and which I will try to explain beneath. People trust each other because they know 
they  belong  to  a  certain  “totality”.  As  Olson  argued:”  “In  collective-action  settings, 
individuals adopt not a materially calculating posture but rather a richer, more emotionally 
nuanced  reciprocal  one.  When  they  perceive  that  others  are  behaving  cooperatively, 
individuals are moved by honor, altruism, and like dispositions to contribute to public goods 
even without the inducement of material incentives.”
23  
These elements are not ‘created’ out of nothing, but are a natural result of having a kind 
of common goal. It is within this common aim in group’s settings, those certain elements like 
honour, reciprocity and cooperation appears. What we try to do with sociological inquiry is to 
exemplify and identify these elements.  
As  Kahan  maintained,  “And  often,  though  certainly  not  always  trust  is  specially 
characteristic of affective relationships. Certainly, its existence tends to promote the affective 
(emotional) element in social relationships. Trust implies power and dependence; the person 
trusted has the power over the one who trusts, as long as trust lasts. But Community is not a 
matter  of  ‘one  way’  trusting  relationships….Trusting  relationships  in  a  community  are 
necessarily reciprocal.”
24 
The relationship between reciprocity and trust is not one of enumeration but a kind of 
accumulation  of  elements.  Both  elements  reinforces  each  other,  that  is  to  say,  that  trust 
enables reciprocity and the reciprocity, in itself, necessitates trust. Since there are many other 
social elements involved in a “social unity” that keeps the unit in a certain direction, these 
elements  are  not  exhaustive.  These  are  just  some  elements,  which  I  brought  in  order  to 
explain in where we could locate law in a social unit like “community”.  
 As Olson further stressed in “The reciprocity theory, in contrast, sees individuals as 
moral  and  emotional  reciprocators.  Most  persons  think  of  themselves  and  want  to  be 
understood by others as cooperative and trustworthy and are thus willing to contribute their 
fair share to securing collective goods.”
25 
It  is  important  to  stress  that  members  in  a  social  units  care  more  about  long-term 
expectations than short term. And for the sake of convenience, I like to claim that logical 
relationships,  which  I  will  explain  hereunder,  are  based  on  short-term  expectations  and 
outcome.  That  is  why  clear  decisions  are  desired  rather  than  something  ambiguous  like 
restoring a relationship. The benefit of restoring a relationship is not something one would 
experience immediately and also the result is not as clear as in regular legal system, based on 
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logic. Since logic based, regular legal  system  aims  at  regulating  and systematizing  every 
action of an individual, it makes every action of an individual immediately judge able.  
 
b) Logic 
Logical relationship, on the other hand, fills in the lacuna, which exist in, when one removes 
the trust element. Since trust cerates certainty and predictability, one needs a substitute for 
this trust element, which is being found in the logical construction of legal rules (and logical 
and deductive reasoning). Logic is an apt way to create a system in which the individual on an 
impersonal basis (so without knowing each other) can enter into relationship. As Cotterrel put 
it:  “Active  interpersonal  trust  is  largely  replaced  in  many  situations  by  a  more  passive 
confidence in impersonal systems (for example, financial, economic or political systems; or 
systems of activity represented by large business corporations or other organizations). Many 
of these social systems are defined, stabilized, and guaranteed by the law of the centralized 
state.”
26 
To go a step further, one can even argue that the community responsibility system as 
Avner Greif defined it, could be even used for impersonal exchanges. In this case, it was the 
community as whole that stood guarantee for the dealings of the individual. As he argues: 
“Mechanism enabling individuals to credibly communicate their social and personal identities 
are  substituted  for  mechanisms  for  contract  enforcement  based  on  public  information 
regarding past actions. Collective responsibility can thus foster impersonal exchange when 
past  actions  are  not  public  information  and  personal  identities  cannot  be  credibly 
communicated across communal boundaries in the absence of collective responsibility:”
27 
Logical construction, therefore, emancipates individuals from their environment and at 
least to a certain extent, gives them the presumption that a society can be build based on 
impersonal relationships between individuals. The logical axiomatic construction of logic, lies 
at  the  roots  of  our  modern  society  with  economics,  or  economical  relationship  as  the 
groundwork for social relationship. Human beings are considered as Homos Economicus by 
Adam Smith,
28 which means that we, human beings, are entrusted with a rational min d to 
make the right decision for our self. As rational human beings, our decisions are logical and 
therefore mathematical. Economical science, which is dedicated in the study of the rational 
homo  economicus’  social  relationship  with  one  another,  constructed  a  whole  social 
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relationship on merely mathematical formula. What they argue is that the way human beings 
act is very logical and easy to be predicted. Human actions can be calculated beforehand and 
regulated. 
It is mainly on this presumption that the modern concept of law is founded on. The 
modern concept of law as Max Weber argued is the product of capitalism in which legal rules 
try to assure the flow of capital to a certain class in the society.
29 The so-called certainty, 
which the modern legal system is praised to have, is based on this logical system of rules, in 
which actions are framed in this so called ”logical framework”. Outside this logical order, 
anything else seems obscure and ambiguous.  
Therefore, it is important to stress that logical methodology substitutes the loss of trust in 
impersonal  relationships  between  partners,  because  “The  language  of  judicial  decision  is 
mainly  the  language  of  logic.  And  the  logical  method  and  form  flatter  that  longing  for 
certainty and for repose which is in every human mind.”
30 
Resembling law with mathematics allows men to predict and regulate human behaviour 
according to beforehand, determined calculated rules. Moreover, law was considered as just a 
mathematical science. As Boonin has stressed ”If Law was even compared with mathematics 
and the judge was considered a kind of geometrician, which implied that judges’ decisions 
were as bound by rules and as logically necessary as mathematical proof.”
31 
As Von Jehring clearly expressed this (and his) annoyance of the employment of logic in 
law, he argues, “This desire for logic that turns jurisprudence into legal mathematics is an 
error and arises from misunderstanding law. Life does not exist for the sake of concepts but 
concepts for the sake of life. It is not logic that is entitled to exist but what is claimed by life, 
by social relations, by the sense of justice-and logical necessity, or logical impossibility, is 
immaterial. One could have considered the Romans mad, if they had ever thought otherwise, 
if they had sacrificed the interests of life to the dialectics of the school.”
32 
Duncan Kennedy, very well illustrates the kind of picture that I want to draw in this 
paragraph about our modern concept of law. He argues “Judgments of validity in modern 
"legal  science"  are  (i)  not  judgments  about  a  matter  of  fact,  but  correct  or  incorrect 
interpretations of the logical requirements of the meanings of the system of norms. They 
are  (ii)  not  ethical  judgments,  because  the  logical  coherence  and  gaplessness  of  the 
system of norms provides no warrant whatever of the moral desirability or moral (as opposed 
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to legal) validity of the norm system as a whole or of any particular norm. They are (iii) 
"scientific" judgments, because validity is established according to interpretive procedures 
strictly bound by logic.
33 As he further stressed ”In this system, as I explained above, 
gaps are filled by the analysis of the system, presupposed to be internally coherent, to build a 
chain downward from some unquestionably valid abstract provision, or upward to and then 
downward from some logically required though unenacted abstract provision.”
34  
The way Logic keeps the systems sustained, by creating its own independent validity 
system (which enables legal positivist Philosophers like Kelsen, to claim that Legal Systems 
work on their own) by way axiomatic deduction, has made legal science earn the title of 
science. But in effect it has no direct relationship with the main goal of the purpose of law, 
namely to have a normative effect on individuals. Because of Logical validity system, less 
attention has been paid on the normative effect of law and its subsequent effect on the society. 
Which would in turn remind us, that law is not a science, but a social phenomenon, indebted 
in the society.  
 
2. Values versus Rules 
a) Values  
The topic on values and rules will encompasses a whole encyclopaedia of books in order to 
outline  and  analyse  it,  reflecting  on  different  scholarly  perspectives,  whether,  (legal) 
philosophical, sociological or anthropological. This is utterly not my aim in this paper. What I 
want to expose is how the underlying distinction of legal consciousness or the generation of 
legal  norms  between  Community  an  society  generates  legal  norms.  It  should  help  us  to 
understand how for example, the Diamond Dealers Club, which I will explain in paper three 
or the Jirga of Pashtunwali Afghans, do not use rules,- whether to not put in written legislative 
acts,- but base their drawings on values. While our modern concept of law is based on a 
logical system, which  logical systemized (or logically reasoned) rules, whether written or not 
(court  decision  and/or  legislative  acts),  in  order  to  induce  individuals  to  certain  actions. 
Values  contain  intrinsic  inducements  by  norms,  while  rules  (might)  contain  extrinsic 
inducement by norms.   
Values contain reason for human action, just like rules do. It forces people to act in a 
certain desired way. The totality of these reason are contained in values. Not all values are 
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normative in nature, meaning that it will not induce individuals to act.  But the totality of the 
values creates an intrinsic normativness, which will make human beings act in a certain way. 
The  reason  might  be  cultural,  religious  or  based  on  certain  business  ethics,  which  the 
members are acquainted with.  
Values can therefore be perceived as guidelines for actions to behave in a certain way. It 
does consist of norms, but these norms are contained in the totality of  (the shell of) values, 
which are persuasive. This is why values (from a sociological point of view) can be perceived 
as a normative set of conducts, which are desired or required to be taken. In order to take up 
an inquiry into sociological nature of values, I have confined myself to Max Weber’s theory 
of values for two reasons. First he makes a connection between incentives and actions. The 
importance of this method is that it provides us with a kind inclination into where the law 
could reside in community. Since community members live according to certain values and 
not so much by legal-rules, it is important to understand how this unfolds in practice. Another 
reason for me to adopt Max Weber’s theory is that his theory on values and actions is a part of 
a  comprehensive  sociological  inquiry  into  how  the  modern  society  is  changing.  This 
juxtaposition  of  different  systems  is  of  importance  for  my  research.  In  the  previous 
paragraphs and in previous paper I have already depicted a certain account of Max Weber 
upon law and logic.  
Max Weber introduced the modern approach to sociology by scrutinizing the action of 
individuals.  Instead of bluntly describing certain sociological features  or concepts, Weber 
made  an  attempt  to  analyse  human  behaviour  and  how  it  would  effect  other  fellow 
individuals. Based on this method, Weber made  an attempt to portray certain incentives that 
lie behind human action. He made an initial distinction between purpose-rational and value 
rational action  
He  explains  purpose-  rationality  and  value-rationality  in  the  following  way:“[Social 
conduct  may]  be  determined  rationally  and  oriented  toward  an  end.  In  that  case  it  is 
determined by the expectation that objects in the world outside or other human beings will 
behave in a certain way, and by the use of such expectations as conditions of, or as means 
toward, the achievement of the actor's own, rationally desired and considered, aims. This case 
will be called purpose-rational conduct. Or, social conduct may be determined, second, by 
the conscious faith in the absolute worth of the conduct as such, independent of any aim, and 
measured by some such standard as ethics, aesthetics, or religion. This case will be called 
value-rational conduct."”
35 
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This highly elaborated outline of Max Weber, in which he tries to portray and link a 
comprehensive  array  of  reasons  to  certain  actions.  This  include  both  analysis  of  human 
behaviour based on irrational reasons as well as on rational reasons. Value-rational reasons 
for  actions  are  conceived  as  irrational  motives  for  certain  actions.  Value-rationality,  in 
contrary to what the words project, are motives that make an appeal on emotions and believes. 
As  he  further  clarifies,  ”From  the  standpoint  of  instrumental  rationality,  however,  value 
rationality is always irrational, and increasingly so as the value to which the action is oriented 
is elevated to the status of the absolute value. For as the intrinsic value of the action (pure 
conviction, beauty, absolute goodness, absolute devotion to duty) comes to the fore more 
unconditionally and exclusively, reflection on the consequences of the action diminishes.”
36 
So compared to purpose rationality (instrumental rationality) he argues that value-rational 
reasons are “always irrational”. In a way human beings are driven both by rational purpose 
aimed reason as well as intuitive, emotional reasons.  
Instead  of  just  describing  what  value  should  entail,  he  connected  those  values  with 
certain human action. In the end it is the action that counts. This is why Weber has classified 
six,  so-called  ”value  spheres”  that  would  influence  our  conscience.  As  Oakes  clearly 
enumerated:  “Weber  seems  certain  that  there  are  precisely  six  such  spheres,  and  no  less 
confident as to what they are: religion, the economy, politics, aesthetics, the erotic (die Erotik) 
and intellectualism.”
37 
 
b) Rules 
Rules  on  the  other  hand  are  just  systematically  collected  directives  of  human  action,  it 
constitutes guidelines in how one should behave. The validity of ‘rules’ as ‘rules’ lies both in 
the logical framing of the rule, logical systematisation with other rules and logical application. 
In  all  these  rules’  validity  stems  from  logical  construction.  Rules  are  just  like  values,  a 
facilitation  of  norms,  but  they  inducement  are  extrinsic  in  contrary  to  values,  which  are 
intrinsic. Rules are always being enforced from outside and needs to an effective enforcement 
institution.
38 
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According to Fuller, “Rules are systematic, public, products of perspective legislation, 
intelligible,  consistent,  feasible,  and  administered  written.”
39  Rules  are  therefore  norms, 
which are induced from outside by way of enforcement procedures. Without enforcement 
procedure, no one would feel inclined to obey the rules, or at least the majority of rules. 
Kelsen on the other hand, brought up a more elaborated account of legal rules within a 
normative logical system, in his celebrated book called, Die Reihne Rechtslehre. He argues 
that a whole range of legal rules, hinges on a kind of “Grundnorm” (Basic norm), which 
function as a kind of an automatic validity system. Each rule is being scrutinised through 
other rules within the chain, up to the “Grundnorm”.   
According to Kelsen, “Eine Vielheit von Normen bildet eine Einheit, ein System, eine 
Ordnung,  wenn  ihre  Geltung  auf  eine  einzige  Norm  als  Letzten  Grund  dieser  Geltung 
zurückgefürht werden kann. Diese Grundnorm konstituiert als die gemeinsame Quelle die 
einheit in der Vielheit aller eine Ordnung bildenden Normen. Und dass eine Norm zu einer 
bestimmten Ordnung gehört, geht nur daraus hervor, dass ihre Geltung auf die- diese Ordnung 
konstituierende- Grundnorm zurïckgeführt werden kann. Nach der art der Grundnorm, das 
heisst aber nach der Natur des obertsen Geltungsprinzips lassen sich zwei verschiedene Arten 
von Ordnungen  (Norm-systemen) unterscheiden. Die Normen der einen Art  “gelten”, das 
heisst das von ihnen angegebene Verhalten der Menschen ist als gesollt anzusehen, kraft ihres 
Gehaltes: weil ihr Inhalt eine unmittelbar evidente Qualität hat, die ihm Geltung verleiht.”
40 
 Kelsen was one of the first legal positivists who tried to emphasise on the legal system 
that exist only out of legal rules, and finds its validity in the logical systematisation of those 
rules.  According  to  Kelsen,  legal  rules  (for  Kelsen  legal  norms,  and  legal  rules  are 
interchangeable. Norm means “sollen”, “ought”). It suffice here to mention that legal rules is 
aimed conditioning a certain action and in this respect as Kelsen has put it constitutes to be an 
“ought”.
41 
In contrary to legal-rules as we know, norms within values can be drawn from values, but 
they cannot exist outside the scope of values. Values constitute the foundation in which norms 
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gets its meaning. As in legal semiotics’ conception of narativization explains, a legal rule can 
never be comprehended without the narrative context in which it resides.
42  
To illustrate this, one can mentioned the distinction between the Quran and Sharia rules. 
The Quran is the primary source for Muslim, which contain values for personal or group 
purposes. It gives direction on how one should live their lives, but can never be a source for 
governing purposes, since it does not contain any clear -cut rules. In the contrary, the holy 
book is rather vague and ambiguous to be employed as a legal source, containing rules. The 
Sharia however is derived from the Quran, and contains only rules, which can be used for 
governing purposes. They are clear and ordered against a certain logical framework. Islamic 
jurisprudence is an independence science based on the Quran, but is not as original as the 
Quran itself. While Quran contain only values, rules that are derived from the Quran are 
gathered together in the Sharia. 
 
3. Judicatory System versus Alternative Dispute Resolution 
a) Alternative Dispute Resolution 
In the past decades the interest in Alternative Dispute Resolution has increased immensely, 
because of its cost and outcome effectivity. While ADR is considered to be a collection of 
extra-judicial  methods  for  legal  disputes,  it  can  also  be  used  for  non-legal  or  extra-legal 
disputes. Moreover, the roots of ADR lie in  anthropological  and sociological inquiries in 
alternative ways to reach for a solution, than by legal and judiciary methods. Since judiciary 
is expensive and takes quite longer than ADR, one started to adopt ADR in regular judicial 
conflicts likes business agreements, divorce procedure, so anything in which maintaining a 
good relationship becomes important.
43 This is why ADR emphasises more on a method that 
restores broken relationships than trying to adjudicate, which does not mean that adjudication 
is disregarded. Resorting relationships does not mean that it cures the relationship but it just 
makes it  possible that a certain dialogue remains in order to achieve certain aims. This 
explains for example why mediation, as a form of ADR, is being employed in divorce cases. 
Which does not mean that it cures the relationship but it at least tries to find a solution in 
which a certain kind of relationship can be maintained, in order to pursue certain duties. Like 
in divorce access with children, ADR is mainly adopted because it reduces a lot stress and 
harm to children and maintaining the contact between parents  for the sake of children is 
essential. This is why ADR is widely endorsed in divorce cases, but also in business contracts.  
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ADR is a collection of possible methods for dispute resolution among which we can 
name mediation, conciliation, negotiation and arbitration.
44 
Starting with arbitration, arbitration is a direct alternative for state-structured judiciary 
system in which the judge is appointed to resolve the disputes, which reach the court. The 
difference between the court procedure and arbitration lies mainly in the fact that the arbiter is 
chosen by both parties and the judge in the regular justice system is appointed. What also 
matters in arbitration is that many cases that reach arbitration are cases, which are founded on 
privately-  drawn  contracts  or  private  legal  systems,  being  agreed  upon.  So  in  essence, 
arbitration already bears a kind of particularity in this case.  
However, one cannot just assume arbitration only as “privately” installed judge. In the 
contrary. One can discern arbitration between official arbitration and unofficial arbitration. 
Official arbitration is always covered by official acts like the British Arbitration act.
45 The 
subsequent courts or tribunals, which are founded upon those acts, like the Jewish Beth Din 
courts or the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, are all based on these acts.
46 Their decisions are 
therefore  legally  and  officially  binding.  It  is  recognized  by  official  institutions  of  the 
government.  
Mediation on the other hand is a method in which a conflict, a dispute or an agreement, 
whose terms has still to be settled, are solved. A third party, with an objective view on the 
matters and relationship, tries to find ways in which both parties would meet in the middle 
way and agree. The aim is not to inquire about the nature or the roots of the problem and 
make judgements (Like the judiciary or arbitration does), but instead to find an agreement 
between the parties who can find themselves in the agreement itself. Maintaining a solid 
endurable relationship is the main prerequisites in mediation. Because even if agreements are 
reached, the parties has to apply the terms of the agreements in practice. This is the reason 
why they both have to agree, and as long as they do not agree with one of the terms the 
mediation process will just continue. In the judiciary system however, people do not have to 
agree  with  the  adjudication  terms.  The  terms  will  just  be  enforced  by  the  judge,  by 
enforcement mechanisms like fine, or even imprisonment. . 
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 Negotiation on the other hand shares the same characteristic and principles as mediation 
but  is  applied  in  commercial  practices.  In  negotiation  the  parties  do  not  want  to  solve  a 
conflict or getting out of a ditch, instead they want to reach the most suitable contract or 
agreement for both parties as possible. They will try to get an agreement, which is the most 
profitable for both parties. They mostly enter into negotiation with a prior set goals, which 
they want set through by way of negotiation. They can negotiate alone or if desired with a 
third person to guide the negotiations.
47 
Conciliation is  a kind  of  mediation but  it’s  emphasising lies  predominantly on post-
conflict  restoration of  relationships.  The kind  of situations  in  which  conciliation  is  being 
employed is mostly harsher than in mediation. While in mediation takes place in the middle of 
a  conflict  or  just  after  the  conflict,  conciliation  only  happens  long  after  the  conflict  has 
already  made  a  lot  damage  for  both  parties.  One  can  say  that  the  parties  who  opt  for 
conciliation are tired of the conflict and want to settle down the conflict.  
After having given a kind of brief introduction into certain methods of ADR, I will now 
try  to  illustrate  how  ADR  functions  in  practice.  I  will  especially  focus  on  non-official 
methods, in order to stress my arguments of self-governing, autonomous social units’ like 
associations and communities.  
To illustrate how ADR functions in practice, especially in non-official, non-state way, I 
will use Afghanistan as an example. Afghanistan is characterized by the heavy presence of 
tribes, communities, clans and Kinships. The conflicts they resolve is very peculiar and with a 
logical mind, absolutely not comprehensible. Conflicts need a thorough engagement in the 
subject manner. One cannot solve a conflict by merely logical deductions. So this is why they 
attach  a  lot  of  value  on  conflict  prevention  by  way  of  adhering  to  certain  values,  very 
strictly
48, which have to be preserved, and if than still a conflict erupts than recourse is been 
done to unconventional methods. 
 The importance of prevention of conflict, and conflict centeredness of ADR app ears in 
the phrase of Ali Wardak where he stresses that “The primary concern in this case is to strike 
a balance between preventing the conflict from becoming a tribal enmity of revenge killing 
and the restoration of collective tribal honour.”
49 The methods applied are simple but effective 
and adjusted to the problems at the floor. To illustrate a short example as stressed by Wardak 
in  which Afghans  try to solve their conflicts  by  arranged marriages  between  conflictions 
                                                           
47 Gordon R. Woodman, Alternative Law of Alternative Dispute Resolution,  32 Cahiers de Droit. 3 1991 
48 See Bernt Glatzer, The Pashtun Tribal System, Ch 10 in G. Pfeffer & D. K. Behera (ed.): Concept of Tribal 
Society 
49 Ali Wardak, Jirga, A traditional Mechanism of conflict Resolution in Afghanistan, p11   22 
families. As he said, “Interestingly, in the last option of responding to murder, the offender 
and the victim's relatives (or their respective tribes) are not only reconciled by  jirga, but 
become (new) relatives by marriage. But, the individual - a woman in this case - often pays 
the price for the tribe’s social survival in this patriarchal group-oriented society. This practice 
is not only in direct conflict with Afghan legal norms, but also a violation of the principles of 
Human Rights. This and the exclusion of women from jirga process are a reflection of the 
patriarchal social structure of Afghan society.“
50 
Here we find a very lucid combination of a practise, which is necessary in order to 
restore the relationship between certain families and the same time a value-judgement based 
on  universalistic  perception  by…  himself.  Whether  women’s  right  is  being  harmed  is 
something that is not at stake. Who would care about women’s rights (or anybody’s right) if 
the whole community (-ies) were being threatened to be exterminated.  
Group survival prevails above individual’s autonomy, which is being protected by certain 
rights deriving from the constitution. As I will explain further in the next coming papers about 
Afghanistan’s constitution, one of the main lacunas in all the past-enacted constitution was 
the emphasis on rights, which did find any recourse within the society. .  
 
b) Judicatory System 
The judicatory system is very much linked to the logical reasoning and systematisation of 
legal rules as I have depicted above. That is why in this paragraph there is not much to say 
except to stress an again the fact the judicatory system aims to try to ascertain issues in order 
to continue. Instead of “restoring the relationship” the judicatory system is stately imposed 
adjudication system, in which the emphasis is laid on reaching certain ‘goals’ or  ‘results’ 
rather than restoring relationships.  
As mentioned above, this is why the judges act as geometricians, simply because rules 
have to be applied according to certain logic. Everything that fall out of certain logic does not 
exist.  
 Whether we have the continental legal systems with its enacted codes and judiciary that 
applies it or the common law system, which has the fact finding judiciary (an active judiciary) 
and encoding of their judgements, in all these cases judgements are made according to certain 
logical reasoning. Because, it is within this logical structure that certainty can be guaranteed.  
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V. Conclusion  
Defining  law  as  being  socially  embedded  brings  us  automatically  to  the  concept  of 
community. Community as a concept provides us the necessary outer ‘shell’, which embraces 
the whole social dynamism within the context, which contributes to the development of legal 
rules. The only thing, which lawyers can do, is only to try to locate how certain processes can 
contribute to the generating and maintain of legal rules within community. 
In  order  to  comprehend  the  phenomenon  of  “community  and  law”  approach,  it 
necessitates changing the mentality from in trying to find the locus of law. For this purpose, 
Tönnies theory and his typification between “Gemeinschaft” and “Gesellschaft” provide us 
with the necessary tools to explore where law resides in community.  
By typifying in the same token the concepts, Trust versus Logic, Values versus Rules, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution versus Judicatory system, I am able to exemplify the locus of 
law in community.  
Trust relation as we found out, constitutes one of the core foundations of the legal system 
within communities. Ina trust relationship, which exist between family relatives, neighbours, 
and communities like in rural villages, enable a personal based exchange system, where the 
reputation of an individual, family or community, constitutes enough certainty to enter in to a 
“business“ relationship. While in logical structure, logic has substituted the Trust relationship, 
by logical, mathematical reasoning, which establishes a kind of trust system for “impersonal 
exchange”.  It  means  for  example  that  a  foreigner  can  enter  into  business  without  even 
knowing the other (trade) partner well.  
While Trust relationship is made possible by a value system, either religious or cultural, 
Logical system is sustained by a logical construction of enforceable rules. Values induce 
people’s behaviour by intrinsically, without a clear enforcement from outside. Whereas the 
logical system, with (legal) rules is extrinsic, and needs a clear organ which will enforce these 
rules. This explain for example why people who employ value system hardly use a code or a 
written system of (legal) rules, this is simply because they “know” how it is.  
The final typification, which illuminates the centre of “law” within the community, is the 
typification  between  Alternative  Dispute  Resolution  and  Judicatory  system.  While  the 
emphasis  in  the  first  one  lies  on  how  to  restore  the  relationship  between  individuals  or 
families, the latter just ascertains certain aggregation of facts, like Boonin calls it “like a 
geometric”.  
These  typifications  enable  us  to  identify  law  within  any  community  or  association, 
instead of trying to analyse whether certain behaviour should be classified as law or not.   24 
Within this “community and law” approach, one can identify law, without really getting too 
much into detail  about  whether one behaviour  should be called law or not.  Since law is 
socially embedded, but that does not mean, as many social scientist argue, that law can be 
conceptualised as a “social process”.  
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